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Abstract
The threat of spoofing can pose a risk to the reliabil-
ity of automatic speaker verification. Results from the bi-
annual ASVspoof evaluations show that effective countermea-
sures demand front-ends designed specifically for the detection
of spoofing artefacts. Given the diversity in spoofing attacks,
ensemble methods are particularly effective. The work in this
paper shows that a bank of very simple classifiers, each with
a front-end tuned to the detection of different spoofing attacks
and combined at the score level through non-linear fusion, can
deliver superior performance than more sophisticated ensemble
solutions that rely upon complex neural network architectures.
Our comparatively simple approach outperforms all but 2 of the
48 systems submitted to the logical access condition of the most
recent ASVspoof 2019 challenge.
Index Terms: spoofing; sub-band countermeasures; presenta-
tion attack detection; ASVspoof; speaker verification.
1. Introduction
A great deal of research in ASV anti-spoofing has focused on
the design of specific front-ends tuned to capture artefacts that
characterise manipulated or synthetic speech. The results of the
ASVspoof 2019 challenge also show that reliable performance
usually demands the fusion of scores derived from an ensemble
of different front-ends. This observation suggests that no single
front-end can detect reliably the full range of artefacts produced
by different spoofing attacks.
There is evidence that spoofing artefacts lie at the sub-band
level [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] and that these can only be detected re-
liably using front-ends that have high spectral resolutions in the
same bands [8, 9]. This means that conventional cepstral pro-
cessing may be detrimental to anti-spoofing performance in the
sense that cepstral analysis averages information across the full
spectrum, rather than emphasising information at the sub-band
level. This in turn may explain why reliable performance is ob-
tained only through the fusion of several systems, with similar
performance not being achieved with single systems. Results
from the ASVspoof 2019 challenge support this hypothesis. Al-
though there are likely to be additional contributing factors, the
top-performing fused-system submission achieved an equal er-
ror rate (EER) of 0.22 % whereas the same team’s single-system
submission achieved an EER of 11.40 %, some 52 times higher.
The observation that different front-ends are required to de-
tect artefacts located within different sub-bands may mean that
the usual approaches to fusion will be sub-optimal. This is prin-
cipally because any single spoofing attack may only be detected
reliably by a single countermeasure within an ensemble. In this
case, linear approaches to score fusion may not exploit the com-
plementarity of each countermeasure to their full potential; lin-
ear combinations of mostly non-informative scores may serve
to dilute informative scores. Non-linear approaches to fusion
may hence be better suited to such scenarios.
The work reported in this paper was designed to test these
hypotheses, namely that: (i) an ensemble of relatively simple
countermeasures, each tuned to the detection of artefacts in
different sub-bands, may help to improve spoofing detection
performance beyond what can be achieved through the fusion
of different countermeasures operating at the full-band level;
(ii) non-linear fusion may better exploit complementarity be-
yond what can be achieved with linear approaches. To the best
of our knowledge, while some work has already demonstrated
the benefit of ensemble methods, e.g. [10, 11, 12], none of the
past work has investigated the reasons why they are beneficial,
and neither have they explored ensemble methods in the context
of fused, attack-optimised, sub-band front-ends.
2. Research hypotheses
To help illustrate the ideas explored in this work, we consider
the hypothetical anti-spoofing example illustrated in Fig. 1.
Plotted on each axis are the scores produced by two different
spoofing countermeasures: CM1 and CM2. Countermeasure
CM1 is tuned to detect artefacts present within a lower sub-
band, at 0-4 kHz for example. Countermeasure CM2 is tuned
to detect artefacts within a higher sub-band, at 4-8 kHz for ex-
ample. Each point in the plot signifies the scores produced by
each countermeasure for a set of utterances. Scores for bona
fide (genuine / not spoofed) utterances are illustrated by green
points (top-right). Also shown are scores for three different
types of spoofing attacks: attack A1, characterised by artefacts
predominantly at low frequencies (blue points, top-left); attack
A2, characterised by artefacts at high frequencies (red points,
bottom right); attack A3, which exhibits artefacts at both low
and high frequencies (orange points, bottom left). The first hy-
pothesis under investigation in this paper is that different spoof-
ing attacks are characterised by artefacts within different sub-
bands and that an ensemble of different front-ends are needed
in order to detect such artefacts reliably.
Both countermeasures produce predominantly high scores
for bona fide utterances; as per standard ASVspoof practice,
high countermeasure scores reflect bona fide trials, whereas low
scores reflect spoof trials. Since CM1 and CM2 and their re-
spective thresholds 𝜃1 and 𝜃2 are tuned for the detection of
spoofing attacks 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 respectively, spoofing attack A1
provokes mostly low scores for CM1 and mostly high scores
for CM2, and vice versa for attack A2. Attack A3 provokes low
scores for both countermeasures. Considering multiple diverse
attacks and countermeasures, a notional decision boundary that
best separates bona fide from spoofing utterances might corre-
spond to a non-linear function. Linear score fusion operators
may not perform well in this case, leading to poor reliability.
The second hypothesis under investigation in this paper is that
a non-linear approach to score fusion or system combination is
needed in order to best exploit the complimentarity of an en-
semble of countermeasures tuned for the detection of specific
spoofing attacks.
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Figure 1: A scatter plot of scores for countermeasures CM1
and CM2. Clusters correspond to bona fide utterances (green)
and three spoofing attacks (A1-blue, A2-red, A3-orange). The
dashed black line indicates a non-linear decision boundary
that best separates bona fide from spoofed utterances.
3. Experimental setup
Experiments were performed with the logical access (LA) par-
tition of the ASVspoof 2019 database and standard proto-
cols [13, 14]. Sub-band analysis and fusion experiments are
furthermore based upon one of the two standard baselines. The
database, baseline and assessment metric are all described here.
3.1. Database and metrics
The ASVspoof 2019 LA database consists of three independent
partitions: train; development; evaluation. Spoofed speech in
each dataset is generated using a set of different speech synthe-
sis and voice conversion algorithms [14]. There is a total of 19
different spoofing attacks. Attacks in the training and develop-
ment set were created with a set of 6 different algorithms (A01-
A06), whereas those in the evaluation set were created with a
set of 13 algorithms (A07-A19). The three partitions are used
according to standard ASVspoof practice [15].
The primary metric used in this work is the minimum nor-
malised tandem detection cost function (t-DCF) metric [16, 17].
The t-DCF reflects the impact of spoofing and countermeasures
(CMs) upon the reliability of an automatic speaker verification
(ASV) system. To give a more intuitive impression of counter-
measure performance, results are also reported in terms of the
pooled equal error rate (EER) computed using [18].
3.2. Baselines
The ASVspoof 2019 baseline systems use either constant Q
cepstral coefficient (CQCC) [19, 20] or linear frequency cep-
stral coefficient (LFCC) [1] front-ends and a common Gaus-
sian mixture model (GMM) back-end. Both LFCC-GMM and
CQCC-GMM baseline systems are described in full in [13, 15].
While results for both baselines are reported in this paper, and
while most of our group’s recent work is based upon constant
Q transform (CQT) representations [21], for reasons discussed
later, experimental work reported here is all based upon modi-
fications to the LFCC front-end. The baseline LFCC front-end
configuration includes 20ms frame-blocking with 10ms shift,
a filterbank with 20 linearly-scaled filters and 20 static, veloc-
ity (∆) and acceleration (∆∆) coefficients, thereby giving 60-
dimensional feature vectors.
The GMM back-end classifier has two 512-component
Gaussian models. The first is a model of bona fide speech
whereas the second is a model of spoofed speech, with both
being learned using bona fide and spoofed speech data from the
ASVspoof 2019 LA training partition. Scores are log-likelihood
ratios (LLRs) computed in the usual way.
4. Sub-band front-ends
Our recent work [9] showed that spoofing artefacts reside at the
sub-band level and that these are best detected with front-ends
that exhibit a high spectral resolution within the same sub-band.
That work used two different CQCC front-ends that were tuned
to increase the spectral resolution at either low or high frequen-
cies. The current work extends this idea by considering an en-
semble of classifiers with each one being tuned for the detection
of a set of specific spoofing attacks and the associated artefacts
no matter where they are in the spectrum. Since the CQT has a
non-linear spectral resolution [21, 22] which is difficult to tune
to specific sub-bands, the work was performed by adapting the
baseline LFCC front-end described in Section 3.2.
Described here is the strategy of spectral resolution and
front-end tuning at the sub-band level. Also presented are re-
sults for each front-end when used with a GMM back-end and
tested against each spoofing attack in the ASVspoof 2019 LA
database.
4.1. Spectral resolution
Use of a spectral resolution that is too high will result in noisy
features. Hence, before sub-band optimisation, we set out first
to optimise the spectral resolution at the full-band level. This
work was performed using the the full ASVspoof 2019 LA
training and development subsets.
While other techniques could also have been applied,
e.g. zero padding, we simply modified the baseline LFCC front-
end (Sec. 3.2) to use a 30 ms window with a 15 ms shift and
used a 1024-point Fourier transform. The resolution was then
decreased using a filterbank in the usual fashion with a number
of filters 𝑁 [23]. For any one experiment, training and devel-
opment data were processed with the given front-end before the
GMM back-end was re-learned and used to process the devel-
opment data in otherwise identical fashion to the baseline.
Results depicted in Table 1 show CM performance in terms
of the min t-DCF and EER against the number 𝑁 of filterbank
filters (first 3 columns). For 𝑁 > 30 filters, both the min t-DCF
and the EER are zero. An alternative approach to optimisation is
hence necessary. We elected arbitrarily to use the Bhattacharyya
distance [24] between the CM score distributions for bona fide
and spoofed trials given by:
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where subscripts 𝑏 and 𝑠 indicate parameters for bona fide and
spoofed score distributions and where 𝜇 and 𝜎 refer to the
means and standard deviations respectively. Results in the last
column of Table 1 show that the distance between score distri-
butions increases for 𝑁 > 30 filters, but with little gain beyond
𝑁 = 70 filters, which is the configuration used for all further
experiments reported in this paper.
Table 1: min t-DCF, EER and Bhattacharyya distance between
bona fide and spoofed score distributions for different numbers
of subband filters 𝑁 . Baseline configuration illustrated in
bold; selected configuration in italics.
Filters (𝑁 ) min t-DCF EER (%) 𝐷𝐵
20 0.2110 2.71 0.1338
30 0.0000 0.79 0.1706
40 0.0000 0.00 0.1770
50 0.0000 0.00 0.1785
60 0.0000 0.00 0.1793
70 0.0000 0.00 0.1826
80 0.0000 0.00 0.1788
90 0.0000 0.00 0.1823
100 0.0000 0.00 0.1830
120 0.0000 0.00 0.1820
4.2. Centre of Mass Function
Attack-specific, sub-band front-ends are designed using heat-
map visualisations [9] which show CM performance at the sub-
band level. An example for the A04 attack is illustrated in
Fig. 2. The heat-map colour signifies CM performance in terms
of t-DCF for a front-end with cut-in and cut-off frequencies of
𝑓min (x-axis) and 𝑓max (y-axis) respectively. We used the centre-
of-mass (CoM) approach [25] to identify a single point in the
heat-map and hence to define a specific sub-band for the detec-
tion of each attack in the development subset (A01–A06).
The CoM is a crude means of coping with a noisy surface
containing multiple minima. The CoM of a distribution of mass
in space is the unique point where the weighted relative position
of the distributed mass sums to zero. We consider the 2D heat-
map as a system of particles 𝑃𝑖 where 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛. Each
particle has coordinates 𝑟𝑖 = [𝑓 𝑖min, 𝑓
𝑖
max] and mass 𝑚𝑖 = (min
t-DCF𝑖)−1. The coordinates 𝑅 = [𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑀min , 𝑓
𝐶𝑜𝑀
max ] of the CoM
satisfy the condition
∑︀𝑛
𝑖=1𝑚𝑖(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑅) = 0. Solving for 𝑅
yields:
𝑅 =
1
𝑀
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑚𝑖𝑟𝑖 (1)
where 𝑀 is the sum of the masses of all the particles in the full
heat-map. We obtain a different 𝑅 for each attack and hence
define six attack-optimised, sub-band CMs. For attack A04 the
CoM point illustrated by the white cross in Fig. 2 signifies a
sub-band of 3209 to 8000 Hz. The CoM-defined sub-bands for
each attack A01-06 are listed in the first column of Table 2.
4.3. Sub-band CM results
Results presented in Table 2 show performance in terms of t-
DCF for the six sub-band and one full-band CM. The bandwidth
of each system is illustrated in the first column.
Results for the development set (columns A01-06) show
that sub-band CMs all yield zero t-DCFs for the attacks for
which they are designed (results in boldface), as they also do
for some other attacks. This is not surprising since there is some
considerable spectrum overlap in the set of sub-band CMs. In-
terestingly, the full-band CM is the only one to achieve zero
t-DCF for all six attacks in the development set. Results for the
evaluation set (columns A07-19) show that the full-band CM
gives similar or substantially lower t-DCFs than sub-band CMs.
These observations are confirmed by pooled t-DCFs (columns
P1) for both the development and evaluation subsets. The ques-
tions now are: (i) whether or not the fusion of attack-specific,
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Figure 2: A 2-D heatmap visualisation (see [9]) illustrating
sub-band level CM performance for attack A04 of the
ASVspoof 2019 LA database. The cut-in frequencies 𝑓min and
cut-off frequencies 𝑓max are indicated on horizontal and
vertical axes respectively. Those of the CoM-defined sub-band
is indicated by the white cross.
sub-band CM scores can give better performance even when
their individual performance is poor relative to the full-band
CM; (ii) what should be the fusion mechanism.
5. Fusion
Fusion experiments aim to assess the second research hypoth-
esis in this work, namely that a non-linear approach to score
fusion or system combination is needed in order to best exploit
the complimentarity of sub-band CMs. We used four different
fusion methods to obtain a single score from the set of seven
scores: six sub-band CMs and one full-band CM.
Approaches to fusion include: a support vector machine
(SVM) [26] with a seventh order polynomial kernel1; multi-
nomial logistic regression [27]; traditional linear fusion [18].
Also tested was a GMM-based approach to fusion for which 64-
component models are learned from the set of scores for bona
fide and spoofed classes. This approach was used previously
for the fusion of ASV and CM scores [28]. Both the GMM and
SVM are non-linear approaches to fusion; the others are linear.
All but the SVM approach produce log-likelihood ratio outputs.
5.1. Fusion results
Fusion results for the four systems are shown in boldface in
Table 3. With a t-DCF of 0.0740, the non-linear GMM ap-
proach gives the best performance. The next best system is the
non-linear SVM approach with a t-DCF of 0.0748. The per-
formance of the two linear approaches yield t-DCFs of 0.0911
and 0.1182. These findings would seem to confirm the hypoth-
esis that a non-linear approach is better suited to the fusion of
sub-band CM scores. This is because spoofing artefacts that
are localised in the spectrum may be detected only by sub-band
CMs whose focus is directed towards the same parts of the spec-
trum and hence be detected reliably by a sub-set of CMs only
(or even only a single CM). In this case, full-band CMs may
dilute relevant information by smoothing across the spectrum
and linear approaches to fusion may not identify the best deci-
sion boundary between bona fide and spoofed speech; such an
optimal decision boundary might be non-linear.
1Linear and residual basis function kernels were also tested and
yielded inferior results. These experiments are not reported here.
Table 2: Results in terms of min t-DCF for development (A01-A06) and evaluation (A07-A19) partitions and respective pooled
min t-DCF (P1) and pooled EER (P2). Results in boldface signify the attack for which each sub-band is optimised, e.g. the CM
designed for attack A01 operates within a sub-band of 2011 to 6403 Hz.
Freq-bands A01 A02 A03 A04 A05 A06 P1 P2 A07 A08 A09 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 A19 P1 P2
2011-6403 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.25 0.79 0.25 0.11 0.37 0.03 0.00 0.55 0.03 0.18 0.31 0.17 0.15 0.25 0.41 0.60 0.93 0.34 13.28
2410-5604 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.42 0.91 0.33 0.13 0.35 0.06 0.00 0.54 0.08 0.23 0.31 0.16 0.16 0.33 0.58 0.87 0.99 0.39 15.50
2011-5604 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.31 0.82 0.29 0.12 0.37 0.06 0.00 0.56 0.08 0.22 0.28 0.18 0.17 0.30 0.48 0.81 0.99 0.38 14.75
3209-8000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.41 0.71 0.10 0.23 0.00 0.47 0.29 0.00 0.26 10.59
15.62-4806 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.51 0.18 0.08 0.45 0.01 0.00 0.54 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.33 0.60 0.85 0.31 12.31
3608-8000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.40 0.79 0.09 0.31 0.00 0.55 0.24 0.00 0.27 11.55
full-band 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.35 0.07 0.00 0.09 03.50
Table 3: Performance for the ASVspoof 2019 evaluation
partition in terms of pooled min t-DCF and pooled EER for
top-performing systems (T05, T45, T60 and T24), four different
approaches to fusion (boldface) and baseline systems (B1, B2).
System min-tDCF EER
T05 0.0069 0.22
T45 [29] 0.0510 1.86
GMM fusion 0.0740 2.92
SVM fusion (polynomial kernel) 0.0748 2.92
T60 [11] 0.0755 2.64
Optimised LFCC (full-band) 0.0904 3.50
Linear fusion 0.0911 3.38
T24 0.0953 3.45
Multinomial logistic regression fusion 0.1182 4.50
LFCC:B2 [13] 0.2116 8.09
CQCC:B1 [13] 0.2366 9.57
5.2. Performance comparison and discussion
Table 3 also shows results for the two ASVspoof 2019 baseline
systems (B1 and B2, last two rows) and the top-performing four
(out of 48 submissions) challenge results [13]. The latter are
signified by their anonymous ASVspoof 2019 identifiers T05,
T45, T60 and T24 [13]. Only T45 [29] and T60 [11] system
details are in the public domain but from these and the descrip-
tion of the ASVspoof 2019 challenge in [13], it is known that all
four of these competing systems are based upon an ensemble of
comparatively complex neural network based architectures, as
opposed to a simple GMM-based solution used in our work.
Furthermore, they used a combination of multiple, different
front-end parameterisations, unlike the use of the single, same
base front-end used in our work. While we acknowledge that
this comparison is between evaluation and post-evaluation re-
sults, both non-linear GMM-based and SVM approaches to fu-
sion outperform all but two of the 48 competing systems. Even
though the gap is not substantial, the two linear approaches to
fusion are outperformed by the two non-linear approaches.
6. Conclusions
The work reported in this paper investigated whether spoofing
attacks leave sub-band artefacts that require specific spoofing
countermeasures for detection. In addition, it sought to deter-
mine whether non-linear fusion approaches offer better poten-
tial to combine the scores produced by ensemble of sub-band
classifiers. Extending our prior work, we used a high-resolution
base front-end that is adapted using a crude center of mass tech-
nique to identify 6 different, additional sub-band front-ends, all
of which are used with a GMM-based back-end that is relearned
for each feature set. Fusion was performed with a variety of dif-
ferent techniques, both linear and non-linear.
Excellent results obtained using a high-resolution, full-
band classifier alone demonstrate the importance of the front-
end. This finding could be beneficial to other anti-spoofing re-
searchers that use neural networks with standard, low-resolution
front-ends. A switch to high-resolution front-ends may improve
performance; even advanced neural network solutions cannot
recover information that is already lost, e.g. in spectro-temporal
decomposition. Our results also show that sub-band classifiers
can detect reliably all attacks in the development data upon
which sub-bands classifiers were learned. Even though evalua-
tion results are far less promising, fusion results still show that
the use of sub-band classifiers helps to improve performance
beyond what can be achieved with a full-band classifier alone
and that non-linear fusion outperforms linear fusion.
Despite its simplicity, our approach outperforms all but
two competing challenge systems. Noting that our approach
is learned used only training data and not combined training
and development data, as was permitted by ASVspoof 2019
rules, noting also that we did not optimise the approach used
for sub-band selection nor tackle spectral overlap in any way,
this is a particularly satisfactory result. Other experiments for
which we do not have the space to report lend further support
to our approach. Leave-one-out fusion experiments showed the
consistent benefit of sub-band classifiers and non-linear fusion.
Also, the use of linearly partitioned sub-bands in an otherwise
identical setup gave worse performance and show the merit of
attack-specific sub-bands, a finding supported by others authors
in concurrent work [30], albeit for replay spoofing attacks.
Our future work will investigate non-linear probabilis-
tic linear discriminant analysis back-end techniques; linear
approaches which assume matching within-class co-variance
proved unsuccessful since the within-class co-variance of bona
fide and spoofed data is different. Score normalisation before
fusion could also be explored as a means to improve perfor-
mance using linear fusion. Another natural extension is to ex-
plore the use of high-resolution and sub-band front-ends with
neural network based architectures. The goal of this work
would be to see if localised spectral information is being used
in the same way and hence to improve upon the interpretability
and explainability of complex neural network techniques.
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